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African countries have experienced dire balance-of-payment problems. In order to improve their
economic prospects, they need to attract foreign investment. But foreign investors are wary of
investing in African economies, not primarily because of economic risks, but because of political
risks. In order to assure investors, African countries have ratified the International Convention for
the Settlement of Investment Disputes. This is meant to reflect to potential investors that the
African States are willing to submit to international arbitration, which is supposed to have the
positive spin-off of encouraging investment. But this article questions whether this membership has
really been to the advantage ofAfrican States. There is no proven correlation between membership
and investment inflows. African States hardly ever use the ICSID to bring cases against foreign
investors; instead, African States are often the respondents. The seat of arbitration is usually in a
developed country with non-African arbitrators and lawyers.
I. International Commercial Arbitration
There are a multitude of dispute settlement mechanisms that parties can choose from in
order to settle any disputes that may arise between them. The options range from negoti-
ation, inquiry and fact-finding, mediation and good offices, conciliation, arbitration, or
litigation. This article focuses on arbitration, specifically international commercial arbi-
tration. International commercial arbitration is a method of resolving disputes that may
arise out of international commercial agreements, such as investment agreements. The
key characteristics of international commercial arbitration are that it is a dispute settle-
ment procedure that is consensual, private, and confidential and that it leads to a final and
binding award determining the rights and obligations of the disputants.'
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International commercial arbitration can be ad hoc or institutional. Ad hoc means the
parties decide, at the time of their commercial agreement, that they will resort to arbitra-
tion in the event of disagreement but do not refer to any standing arbitral institution.2
When a dispute arises, it is then that they must agree on the arbitrators as well as the rules
and procedures that will govern their arbitration. This has the obvious short-coming in
that, when parties are already in dispute, it may not be possible for them to reach agree-
ment due to the general mood of discord.3 What can be of assistance is for the parties to
agree to adopt standing rules such as the United Nations Commission on Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration.4 Institutionalized
arbitration refers to arbitration held under the auspices of a standing forum for arbitration
such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) or the International Chamber of Com-
merce (ICC).5 Parties usually agree before a dispute arises that it will be resolved by a
named arbitral institution. Arbitration can be between two states or it can be between a
state on one hand and a non-state entity (such as an individual or a corporation) on the
other hand. In the latter case it is referred to as "mixed arbitration." 6 The International
Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of
Other States creates a system for institutionalized mixed arbitration.7
Arbitration has been lauded over litigation as a faster and easier method of settling legal
disputes.8 Unlike with litigation, where the judges are arbitrarily designated, arbitration
allows parties to select their arbitrators, which means that they can choose individuals with
particular expertise who are able to quickly comprehend complex technical issues.9 As
Collier and Lowe have correctly asserted,
"[w]here the courts might appear remote, rigid, and slow and expensive in their pro-
cedures and the judges might seem unversed in the ways of commerce and the law,
insensitive and ill adapted to the exigencies of commercial life, arbitrators offered an
attractive alternative. [Arbitrators] were originally drawn from the same commercial
community as the traders, often experienced in the trade, capable of offering practical
suggestions for the settlement of the dispute and of doing so informally, quickly and
cheaply."1o
Arbitrators that are quick to grasp the complex issues will also be quick to dispense with
the dispute, thus saving the parties time and, more importantly, money. Another argu-
Add.38, available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/edmmisc232add38_en.pdf [hereinafter U.N. Conference on
Trade and Dev. 5.1].
2. Id. at 31.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 30. For a li:t of commercial arbitration institutions and the rules of those institutions, see Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration Institutions and Institution Rules, LEX MERCATORIA, http://www.jus.uio.nollm/ar
bitration/institution.rules.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2013).
6. GEORGlos PETROCIELOS, PROCEDURAL LAW IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 227 (James L.
Fawcett eds. 2004).
7. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States art. 1(2), opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270 [hereinafter Convention].
8. U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev. 5.1, supra note 1, at 15.
9. Id. at 14.
10. JOHN G. COLLIER & VAUGHN LOWE, THE SErTLEMENT OF DIsPUTEs IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDUREs 45-46 (1999).
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ment has been that arbitration is preferable to litigation because it gives parties more
control over the dispute resolution process by allowing them to determine-by agree-
ment-the forum, the applicable law, and the procedures to be adopted.'" There is flexi-
bility because the parties can choose to by-pass certain procedural requirements associated
with litigation that could potentially lengthen the settlement of the dispute. This flexibil-
ity also contributes to faster and cheaper resolution of disputes. The arbitration agree-
ment, or compromis d'arbitrage, may even provide for settlement by application of extra-
judicial principles.12 For example, Article 42(3) of the Convention allows for the settle-
ment of disputes ex aequo et bono according to principles of what is fair and just, thus
overriding the application of strict rules of law.13 Govindjee et al. agree that "one of the
main reasons that arbitration is a more popular remedy than going to court is because the
normal court process has very complex and specific rules relating to the manner in which a
case is presented to the presiding officer."l 4
The inequality of the parties is said to be mitigated by the neutrality of arbitration.' 5 It
doesn't matter if the dispute is between a state on one side and an individual investor on
the other; they are both equal before the tribunal, particularly because the battle is not
fought on the turf of any of the parties to the dispute. Arbitration further assures parties
of confidentiality.16 The ambits of this confidentiality is captured in Article 30 of the
London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) Rules, which provide that
"[u]nless the parties expressly agree in writing to the contrary, the parties undertake
as a general principle to keep confidential all awards in their arbitration, together
with all materials in the proceedings created for the purpose of the arbitration and all
other documents produced by another party in the proceedings not otherwise in the
public domain - save and to the extent that disclosure may be required of a party by
legal duty, to protect or pursue a legal right or to enforce or challenge an award in
bona fide legal proceedings before a state court or other judicial authority."' 7
The confidential character of arbitration was also captured by the English Court of Ap-
peals in Doling-Baker v. Merrett, which states that:
"[a]s between parties to an arbitration, although the proceedings are consensual and
may thus be regarded as wholly voluntary, their very nature is such that there must, in
my judgment, be some implied obligation on both parties not to disclose or use for
any other purpose any documents prepared for and used in the arbitration, or dis-
closed or produced in the course of the arbitration, or transcripts or notes of the
evidence in the arbitration or the award, and indeed not to disclose in any other way
11. U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev. 5.1, supra note 1, at 15.
12. U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., New York and Geneva, 2005, Dispute Settlement: International
Commercial Arbitration, 5.2 The Arbitration Agreement, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.39 at 11,
available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/edmmisc232add39_en.pdf.
13. Convention, supra note 7, art. 42(3).
14. AVINASH GOVINDJEE ET AL., COMMERCIAL LAw 2: FRESH PERSPECTIVES 296 (2007).
15. U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev. 5.1, supra note 1, at 16.
16. Id. at 7 - 8.
17. Rules of the London Court of International Arbitration, art. 30, reprinted in 10 Y.B. COM. ARB. 157,
166 (1985), available at http://www.Icia.org//DisputeResolution-Services/LCIAArbitrationRules.aspx#arti
cle 14.
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what evidence had been given by any witness in the arbitration, save with the consent
of the other party, or pursuant to an order or leave of the court. That qualification is
necessary, just as in the case of the implied obligation of secrecy between banker and
customer."' 8
Once parties agree to arbitration, that agreement will exclude recourse to other meth-
ods of resolving the dispute. In the Maritime International Nominees Ertablishment'9 litiga-
tion, the courts of Belgium and Switzerland dismissed applications for the indication of
provisional measures in a dispute of which the International Centre for the Settlement of
International Disputes was seized. 20 Similarly the United States Supreme Court in Mit-
subishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc. upheld the parties' agreement to arbi-
trate. 21 Soler was a Puerto Rican automobile dealership that entered into a contract with
Mitsubishi (a Japanese company) under which Mitsubishi manufactured vehicles that were
then sold by Soler. 22 Paragraph VI of the parties' agreement contained an arbitration
clause providing that disputes were to be "finally settled by arbitration in Japan in accor-
dance with the rules and regulations of the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association." 23
When, subsequently, Mitsubishi filed a request for arbitration, Soler contested submission
to arbitration. 24 The District Court ordered parties to go for arbitration as per their
agreement. 25 On appeal to the Supreme Court, it was held that an agreement to arbitrate
must be complied with and that the policy considerations favoring upholding the agree-
ment to arbitrate outweighed U.S. public policy against the arbitration of anti-trust
claims. 26 In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 27 the Supreme Court considered that an agree-
ment to arbitrate is "in effect, a specialized kind of forum-selection clause" 28 and that that
a "parochial refusal by the courts of one country to enforce an international arbitration
agreement would not only frustrate" the orderly and predictable resolutions that the par-
ties had intended to achieve with their forum-selection clause, but would also invite "mu-
tually destructive jockeying" for advantage.29
Dispute resolution by way of arbitration is also commended for leading to a final and
binding determination of a dispute and an award that is not subject to any appeal mecha-
nism. 30 International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Article 34(6) provides that
"[e]very award shall be binding on the parties. By submitting the dispute to arbitration
under the Rules, the parties undertake to carry out any award without delay and shall be
18. Dolling-Baker v. Merrett, [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1205 A.C. at 1213 (Eng.). .
19. Mar. Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Government of Guinea (Liech. v. Guinea), ICSID Case No.
ARB/84/4, 5 ICSID Rev. 95 (1990).
20. Similarly, states are bound not to give diplomatic protection or to bring international claims in respect
to disputes involving their nationals who have submitted to arbitration, unless the State party to the dispute
has failed to comply with an award. Convention, supra note 7, art. 27.
21. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 640 (1985).
22. Id. at 616-17.
23. Id. at 617.
24. Id. at 618-20.
25. Id. at 620.
26. Id. at 638-39.
27. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
28. Id. at 519.
29. Id. at 516-517.
30. U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev. 5.1, supra note 1, at 8.
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deemed to have waived their right to any form of recourse insofar as such waiver can
validly be made."3' This is echoed in Article III of the Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention), which requires
the Contracting States to "recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accor-
dance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon." 32 The
fact that an award is not subject to appeal on the merits gives the parties added security
about the finality of the resolution process. Arbitration awards are also easier to enforce
in foreign states than judicial judgments tend to be. Usually, "unless there is a treaty
between the State in which the judgment was issued and the State in which enforcement is
sought, the requested court is under no international obligation to enforce the judg-
ment,"33 thus complicating enforcement for the successful party. "By way of contrast, 135
States are party to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards. While there are lingering problems with implementation of the
Convention by the courts in some States, they are on the whole relatively minor ones." 34
II. Problems with International Commercial Arbitration
While not disagreeing with the above arguments, it is important to note that it is not
always the case that arbitration, especially international investment arbitration, becomes a
speedy and inexpensive tool for dispute settlement. 35 Frank E.A. Sander notes that the
"theoretical advantages of arbitration over court adjudication are manifold . . . . These
theoretical advantages [however] are not always fully realized." 36 There are several rea-
sons why these advantages may not materialize. First of all is the argument that arbitra-
tion costs less than litigation. If the arbitration is institutional, it means that the parties
have to pay a fee for using the facilities and pay the Secretariat for managing the process.37
Parties also have to pay the arbitrators sitting as the tribunal and any incidental expenses
of the arbitration (such as the costs of photocopying, transcribing, translating, etc.).38
These costs can add up and defeat the goal of arbitration of offering a cost-effective reso-
lution for a dispute. Out of 254 arbitrations that were conducted between 1991 and 2010
in over twenty arbitral institutions, it was found that party costs averaged around
£1,348,000 in common law countries and £1,521,000 in civil law countries and that 74
percent of party costs were spent on external legal costs.3 9 Taking the example of the
31. Int'l Chamber of Commerce, ICC Rules of Arbitration (2012), available at http://www.iccwbo.org/pro
ducts-and-services/arbitration-and-adr/arbitration/icc-rules-of-arbitration/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2013).
32. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral AwardsJune 10, 1958,21 U.S.T.
2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 4739.
33. U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev. 5.1, supra note 1, at 16.
34. Id. at 17.
35. Id. at 15.
36. CHARTERED INST. OF ARBITRATORS, CIARB COSTS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY 2011
2 (2011), available at http://www.ciarb.org/conferences/costs/0 12-the-survey/ (follow "Download the results
of CIArb's survey" link).
37. OLSWANG, COSTS IN ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS (July 2007), available at http://singaporeintemation
alarbitration.files.wordpress.com/2012/07/costs-in-arbitration-proceedings.pdf.
38. Id.
39. CHARTERED INST. OF ARBITRATORS, supra note 36, at 2.
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London Court of International Arbitration, some of the relevant fees include the
following:40
1. A non-refundable Registration Fee (payable in advance with the request for arbitra-
tion) of £1,750.
2. Time spent by the Secretariat of the LCIA in the administration of the arbitration-
£225 per hour (for the Registrar/Deputy Registrar/Counsel; £100 or 2150 per hour
for other Secretariat personnel depending on the activity).
3. Appointment Fee (payable in advance with request-non-refundable)-21,250.41
4. Deciding challenges to the appointment of arbitrators-21,250.42
5. Fees for arbitrators (approximately £450 per hour depending on the circumstances
and complexity of the case and on the qualifications of the arbitrators).
6. "A sum equivalent to 5% of the fees of the Tribunal (excluding expenses) in respect
of the LCIA's general overhead [as well as] [e]xpenses incurred by the Secretariat and
by members of the LCIA Court, in connection with the arbitration (such as postage,
telephone, facsimile, travel etc.), and additional arbitration support services, whether
provided by the Secretariat or the members of the LCIA Court from their own re-
sources or otherwise."43
Regarding the argument that arbitration resolves disputes quicker than litigation in-
stead, it can be found that arbitration can involve a lot of lengthy paperwork on technical
issues arising from lengthy and complex agreements and facts.44 This can lengthen the
time needed to arbitrate a dispute. Typically, arbitrations can last up to a year and a half
to two years-hardly a speedy resolution.45 Furthermore, the argument that the element
of the finality of the award is always a positive outcome is flawed. Errors made in the
arbitral award cannot be corrected on appeal and this can operate detrimentally on the
effected party.46 Another limitation of arbitration is that an arbitral tribunal has limited
powers and depends on the national legal system at various stages of the arbitration pro-
cess.47 For example, a tribunal cannot subpoena witnesses to appear before it or order the
attachment of funds for the enforcement of an award.48 Redfern and Hunter comment
that
[these] are not powers that any state is likely to delegate to a private arbitral tribunal,
however eminent or well-intentioned that arbitral tribunal may be. In practice, if it
becomes necessary for an arbitral tribunal to take coercive action in order to deal
properly with the case before it, such action must usually be taken indirectly, through
the machinery of the local courts, rather than directly, as a judge himself can do. 49
40. Schedule ofArbitration Costs, LONDON COURT OF INT'L ARBITRATION (Mar. 30, 2013), http://www.Icia
.0rg/DisputeResolutionServices/LCIAArbitrationCosts.aspx.
41. Excluding time spent in carrying out the function and expenses incurred.
42. Excluding time spent in carrying out the function and expenses incurred.
43. Schedule ofArbitration Costs, supra note 40, at 1(d)-(e).
44. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 85 (2009).
45. CHARTERED INST. OF ARBITRATORS, supra note 36, at 12.
46. U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev. 5.1, supra note 1, at 15.
47. ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBI-
TRATION 24 (4th ed. 2004).
48. Id. at 24 - 25.
49. Id. at 25.
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So, even though parties may wish to completely exclude national courts, this may not
always be possible to achieve due to the limited powers of arbitrators.
Another problem emanates from the freedom of the parties to select the procedural
rules that are applicable to their arbitration. Parties often exclude common law evidence
rules only to find, to their disadvantage, that excluding these rules (for example the hear-
say rule) can lead to decisions based on unreliable evidence.50 Lastly, arbitrations have
been tainted by the problem of arbitrators wishing to act in disputes that they attempted
to conciliate or mediate. In conciliation, parties have to be more open with information
because they understand the role of the conciliator as being to facilitate the parties in
reaching their own resolution of the dispute. To do this, the third party generally needs to
know what each party will and will not accept. The problem arises when the dispute
moves from conciliation/mediation to arbitration and the conciliator/mediator shows an
interest in acting as arbitrator. Parties in this situation are often caught in an embarrass-
ing dilemma. On the one hand, they do not want to insult or question the integrity of the
arbitrator (who may be desired in other future disputes), but on the other hand, they do
not want him or her to act in both roles. For this reason, the agreement should include a
"without prejudice" proviso as a minimum but should provide that conciliators/mediators
cannot act as arbitrators in the same dispute. But despite these challenges, arbitration
remains very popular for resolving international commercial disputes, particularly the ar-
bitral procedures under the International Convention for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes.
M. The Origins of the International Convention for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes
The International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of other States (Convention) was the brainchild of the Executive
Board of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) or the
World Bank.5 1 It arose out of the realization that developing economies would benefit
from increased investment flows from the developed world. 52 There were many reasons
why the South could be attractive to investors from the North, such as the abundance of
natural resources, cheaper labor, as well as less regulated markets. But investors from
developed countries regarded such destinations as risky due to their social, political, and
economic instability. Investors were also wary of using the courts in developing countries
to resolve investment disputes, particularly where the foreign government was a potential
defendant. The problems they perceived as associated with these domestic courts in-
cluded the impartiality of the judges and inefficient judicial processes, together with unfa-
50. George M. Von Mehren & Claudia T. Salomon, Submitting Evidence in an International Arbitration: The
Common Lawyer's Guide, 20 J. INT'L ARB. 285, 285 (2003).
51. See Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, 11, (Apr. 2006),
available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRREnglish-final.pdf [hereinafter IC-
SID Convention, Regulations and Rules].
52. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., New York and Geneva, 2003, Course on Dispute Settlement:
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 2.1 Overview, 11, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/EDM/
Misc.232, available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/ednunisc232overview-en.pdf [hereinafter U.N. Conference
on Trade and Dev. 2.1].
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miliar laws and procedures. There were also the difficulties associated with enforcing
judgments against the state. It was felt that one measure that would positively influence
foreign investors to invest in developing economies would be if these countries were to
guarantee access to international arbitration should any dispute arise out of a foreign in-
vestment.53 Therefore, in 1964, the Executive Directors of the World Bank drafted a
convention establishing facilities and procedures that would be available on a voluntary
basis for the settlement of investment disputes between Contracting States and nationals
of other Contracting States through conciliation and arbitration. 54 This draft convention
was submitted to the governments of the Member States of the World Bank and it entered
into force on October 14th, 1966.ss It aims at strengthening international partnership in
achieving the economic development of developing countries by stimulating the flow of
international private capital into such countries.56
IV. Arbitration Under the International Convention for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes
One hundred and fifty eight states are signatories to the Convention, with 149 having
deposited instruments of ratification of the Convention.5 7 The Convention creates the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (the Centre or ICSID),58
which provides facilities for conciliation as well as arbitration.59 Requests for conciliation
are rare; the procedure has only been invoked nine times in the history of the Centre. 60
Conciliation, in general, involves a third person, or commission, assessing the arguments
of the disputants and putting forth advice on how to settle the dispute; the settlement tries
to take the interests of both parties into account.61 The advice is not binding on the
parties and is thus markedly different from arbitration, which concludes with a final, bind-
ing, and enforceable award.62 In 1978, the Centre added the Additional Facility to its
53. See id. at 12.
54. ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, supra note 51, at 38.
55. Id. at 5.
56. U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev. 2.1, supra note 52, at 11.
57. Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, List of Contracting States and Other Signatories ofthe.Convention
(as ofMay 20, 2013), ICSID/3 (May 20, 2013), available at https-J/icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?re
questType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&language=English [hereinafter List of Contracting
States].
58. Convention, supra note 7, art. 1(1).
59. Id. art. 1(2).
60. RSM Prod. Corp. v. Republic of Cameroon, ICSID Case No. CONC/ 1/1 (June 11, 2013); Republic
of Equatorial Guinea v. CMS Energy Corp., ICSID Case No. CONC(AF)/12/2 (filed June 29, 2012); Hess
Equatorial Guinea, Inc. v. Republic of Equatorial Guinea, ICSID Case No. CONC(AF)/12/1 (filed May 15,
2012); Shareholders of SESAM v. Central African Republic, ICSID Case No. CONC/07/1 (Aug. 13, 2008);
Togo Electricit6 v. Republic of Togo, ICSID Case No. CONC/05/1 (Apr. 6, 2006); TG World Petroleum
Ltd. v. Republic of Niger, ICSID Case No. CONC/03/1 (proceeding closed on Apr. 8, 2005); SEDITEX
Engineering Beratungsgesellschaft fir dieTextilindustrie m.b.H. v. Madagascar, ICSID Case No. CONC/94/
1 (uly 19, 1996); Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v. Trinidad and Tobago, ICSID Case No. CONC/83/1 (Nov. 27,
1985); SEDITEX Eng'g Beratungsgesellschaft fir die Textilindustrie m.b.H. v. Democratic Republic of Mad-
agascar, ICSID Case No. CONC/82/1 (proceeding closed on June 20, 1983).
61. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev. 2.1, supra note 52, at 13.
62. Id.
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services.63 This allows conciliation and arbitration to proceed even under circumstances
where a dispute involves a non-State party or where the investor is not a national of a
contracting State.64 The Convention is not applicable to Additional Facility Proceedings
and Contracting Parties are not automatically bound by the Additional Facility Rules. 65
For disputing parties to have access to the Additional Facility, they have to mutually agree
and, further, seek the approval of the Secretary General, who will reach a decision consid-
ering whether the jurisdictional requirements of the Facility are met.66 This Facility has
been invoked in forty-four disputes before the Centre. 67
The Centre is made up of two main organs-the Administrative Council and the Secre-
tariat.68 The former is the decision-making organ that meets once a year, usually at the
same time as the meetings of the World Bank Governors.69 It is chaired by the President
of the World Bank and each Member State has one vote.70 The Council is responsible for
the adoption of the rules for conciliation and arbitration proceedings and generally for
supervising the operation of the Centre.7' The Secretariat is responsible for the day-to-
day running of the Centre and has employees from the Member States. 72 In addition, the
Centre maintains a list of persons of high moral character and recognized competence in
the fields of law, industry, or finance who may be relied upon to exercise independent
judgment and who may serve as conciliators or arbitrators.73
A State must ratify the Convention for it to apply. Furthermore, the parties to the
dispute must consent to the submission of a dispute to the Centre. Under the Conven-
tion, consent to arbitration is presumed to exclude all other remedies, although that pre-
sumption may be rebutted.74 For example, a Contracting State may stipulate that local
remedies must first be exhausted before it engages in arbitration, 75 or parties to a dispute
may agree between themselves upon an alternative dispute settlement procedure before
approaching the Centre. Article 25 of the Convention provides for the subject matter
jurisdiction of the Centre and reads as follows:
The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of
an investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency
of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of an-
other Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit
63. Id. at 10.
64. Id.
65. Int'l Centre for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, ICSID Additional Facility Rules 10 (an. 2003), available at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/AdditionalFacilityRules.jsp.
66. Id.
67. Forty-two times in arbitration proceedings and twice in conciliation proceedings. See Search ICSID
Cases, INT'L CTR. FOR SFTrLEMENT OF INv.DISPUTEs, https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?re
questType=CasesRH&reqFrom=Main&actionVal=ViewAllCases (last visited Sept. 16, 2013) (follow "Click
here for advanced search options" link and select "Additional Facility" under "Procedural Rules Applied"
drop-down tab).
68. Convention, supra note 7, art. 3.
69. Id. art. 7(t).
70. Id. art. 5, 7(2).
71. Id. art. 6.
72. Id. art. 11.
73. Id. art. 12, 14(1).
74. Id. art. 26.
75. Id.
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to the Centre. When the parties have given their consent, no party may withdraw its
consent unilaterally.76
The proceedings begin with the claimant lodging a request for arbitration, which con-
tains the issues in dispute, with the Secretary General of the Centre.77 The dispute is
registered by the Secretary General and the other party is notified of such and furnished
with a copy of the claim.78 The arbitral tribunal is established soon thereafter.79 The
tribunal may be composed of a sole arbitrator or three arbitrators.80 Where there are
three arbitrators, one party appoints one arbitrator, the other appoints the second arbitra-
tor, and the final arbitrator (who will function as the Umpire or President of the tribunal)
is appointed by agreement of the parties. 8' After deciding on its jurisdiction, as per Article
41 of the Convention, the tribunal will proceed to examine the written submissions as well
as the oral submissions of the parties. 82 The Convention contains clauses to ensure that
neither party can frustrate the proceedings. An example is Article 45, which provides that
the tribunal mayproceed regardless of the non-appearance of one party, although it fur-
ther cautions that such failure to appear "shall not be deemed an admission of the other
party's assertions."83
The award is agreed upon by a majority of the votes of the members of the tribunal,84
and the Centre is prohibited from publishing the award without the consent of the par-
ties.85 The award is binding on the parties and is not subject to any appeal or other
remedy, except for those provided for in the Convention. 86 The remedies mentioned in
the Convention are Interpretation (Article 50)87, Revision (Article 51),88 and Annulment
of the Award (Article 52).89 Otherwise, Article 54 enjoins Contracting State parties to
recognize awards as "binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award
within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State." 90 Recognition
and enforcement of the award may be sought in any state that is party to the Conven-
tion.91 Therefore, the victor may select recognition and enforcement in the most
favorable forum. This will be determined by the availability of suitable assets in the state
where enforcement is sought. A party must furnish the award, certified by the Secretary
76. Id. art. 25(1).
77. Id. art. 36(1)(2).
78. Id. art. 36.
79. Id art. 37(1).
80. Id. art. 37(2)(a).
81. Id. art. 37.
82. Id. art. 41.
83. Id. art. 45.
84. Id. art. 48(1).
85. Id. art. 48(5).
86. Id. art. 53(1).
87. Id. art. 50(1) (where there is a dispute between the parties as to the meaning or scope of an award).
88. Id. art. 5 1(1) (where, after the grant of an award, there is the discovery of some fact of such a nature as
decisively to affect the award).
89. Id. art. 52(l)(a)-(e) (on grounds that: (a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted; (b) that the
Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers; (c) that there was corruption on the part of a member of the
Tribunal; (d) that there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or (e) that the
award has failed to state the reasons on which it is based).
90. Id. art. 54(1).
91. Id.
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General, to a competent court in order to obtain recognition and enforcement. 92 Because
of the international law principle of state immunity from execution, only commercial
property may be the subject of execution and not property serving an official or govern-
mental purpose, although this distinction is not always easy to make.93
Collier and Lowe state that "the ICSID Convention has been a great success: it has
been ratified by over 125 States, from all geographical and political blocs, and accession to
the Convention appears to be a high priority for newly independent States keen to attract
foreign investments."94 But it begs to be questioned whether there is much benefit that
has been derived by African States nearly four decades after joining the Convention.
V. The Experience of African Countries in the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes
On the African continent there are forty-six countries that are Contracting State parties
to the Convention.95 The last African country to deposit its instrument of ratification was
Sao Tome and Principe, which ratified the Convention on May 20, 2013.96 The eleven
African States that are not parties are Angola, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Libya,
Reunion, South Africa, Western Sahara, Ethiopia, Namibia, and Guinea-Bissau. The last
three states signed the Convention but have never ratified it, so they will not be taken to
be parties to the Convention in this article. 97 This is because ratification is the means by
which "a State establishes on the international plane its consent to be bound by a treaty".98
Membership thus begins with ratification and, further, without ratification the Conven-
tion cannot be invoked in any arbitration before the Centre. Article 68 of the Convention
clearly pronounces that the Convention is "subject to ratification, acceptance or approval
by the signatory States in accordance with their constitutional procedures." 99 African
States make up about 31 percent of the total membership of the Centre.100
Most African States became contracting state parties to the Convention in the 1960's as
they were gaining independence, 01 and since then, out of the 428 arbitrations that have
been conducted under the auspices of the Convention, 101 have involved African nations,
of which thirty-two arbitration cases are still pending.102 An African State party has initi-
92. Id. art. 54(2).
93. U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., New York and Geneva, 2003, Dispute Settlement: International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 2.9 Binding Force and Enforcement, 18, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/
EDM/Misc.232/Add.8, available at http://unctad.org/en/Does/edmmisc232add8_en.pdf.
94. COLLIER & LowE, supra note 10, at 60.
95. List of Contracting States, supra note 57.
96. Id. The Convention entered into force on June 19, 2013.
97. Id.
98. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2(l)(b), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
99. Convention, supra note 7, art. 68(1).
100. See List of Contracting States, supra note 57.
101. See id. Twenty-six countries joined in the 1960s, twelve in the 1970s, none in the 1980s, four in the
1990s, and four have joined since the year 2000.
102. Out of nine disputes that have been brought for conciliation under ICISD, eight have involved African
states; only one of which involved the African State as the claimant. Search ICSID Cases, supra note 67 (follow
"Click here for advanced search options" link and select "Conciliation" under "Arbitration/Conciliation"
drop-down tab).
FALL 2013
260 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
ated proceedings on only two occasions in the history of the Centre.10 3 And, although
they are members, Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Chad, Comoros, Lesotho, Malawi,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Swazi-
land, Uganda, and Zambia have never been involved in any form of proceedings in the
Centre, either as claimants or as respondents.
African States primarily signed on to the Convention because it was recommended that
this would give assurance to potential investors that their economies were safe to invest in
because of the guarantee of an internationalized dispute settlement procedure. Many Af-
rican States are parties to Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), which specifically make
reference to the Centre's dispute settlement procedures and form the basis of consent in
many disputes brought against them before arbitral tribunals. African States are parties to
227 BITs,0'4 the first of which was signed between Germany and Togo'05 and the last one
was between China and Mali.10 6 Cases involving African States have involved disputes in
many economic sectors such as mining, hospitality, telecommunications, oil exploration,
commercial farming, and power generation, just to name a few.
Most of the claimants in arbitrations against African States (fifty-three) have been Euro-
pean, while fourteen have been from the United States of America.10 7 Although China
and Chinese investors are leading investment on the African continent' 08 and China has
entered into thirty BITs with African States, there has never been an arbitration conducted
between an African State and a Chinese investor in the Centre.1o9 One reason for this had
to do with China's notification under Article 25(4) of the convention."10 When China
ratified the convention, it stipulated that it "would only consider submitting disputes over
compensation resulting from expropriation and nationalization.""' Therefore, arbitra-
tion was only available where the dispute involved expropriation, and, even then, the mer-
its of the expropriation were excluded; only the quantum of the compensation awarded
could be the subject of arbitration. During that period Jie Wang remarked that,
perhaps due to such reservation and limitation, there have been no publicly reported
ICSID cases involving China as a party despite the size of the country, the volume of
103. CMS Energy Corp., ICSID Case No. CONC(AF)/12/2; Gabon v. Soci6t6 Serete S.A., ICSID Case No.
ARB/76/1 (discontinued on Feb. 27, 1978).
104. INT'L CTR. FOR SETLEMENT OF INv. DISPUTES, INVESTMENr PROMOTION AND PROTEcTION
TREATIES: CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX (uly 2012), available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet
?requestType=ICSIDNewsLettersRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&Docld=DCEVENTS 16.
105. Id. at 1. Signed May 16, 1961 and entered into force December 21, 1964.
106. Id. at 30. Signed February 12, 2009 and entered into force July 16, 2009.
107. Karel Daele & Mishcon de Reya, Africa's Track Record in ICSID Proceedings, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (May
30, 2012), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2012/05/30/africa%E2%80%99s-track-record-in-icsid-pro
ceedings/.
108. Tayyab Safdar, China's Growing Influence in Africa, THE ExPREss TRIB., Aug. 30, 2012, available at
http://tribune.com.pk/story/428026/chinas-growing-influence-in-africal ("[here are around 800 Chinese
firms in Africa, investing in the infrastructure, energy and banking sectors ... [and] [lt]he deepening relation-
ship between China and the continent has led to the formation of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
(FOCAC)").
109. Daele & Reya, supra note 107.
110. Convention, supra note 7, art. 25(4).
111. Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, Contracting States and Measures Taken ly Tbem for the Purpose of
the Convention, ICSID/8-D (May 2013).
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its in-bound investment, the scale of its operations, and the in-depth involvement of
the state of economic activity within its borders.112
But new generation Chinese BITs have modified this stance. Now, China's Model
Law provides that all disputes are arbitrable, not just questions of the quantum of
compensation."13 It has been suggested that this change of position is attributable to
the trend that
China has gradually become one of the world's largest capital exporters, so its require-
ments and expectations [have changed] towards greater levels of investment protec-
tion. China invested US$11.7 billion in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2006, mainly in the
production and export of oil from Angola, Chad, Nigeria, and Sudan. Such extensive
investment will inevitably give rise to disputes.114
Apart from this, cultural factors also come into play. Chinese investors are more likely
to seek to resolve disputes amicably without resort to formal processes such as arbitration
or litigation. This culture is also reflected in the requirements of the new Model BIT.
Section m of the proposed text concerns investor-state dispute settlement and provides
that,
1. The disputing parties shall first attempt to settle a claim through consultation or
negotiation.
2. With a view to settling the claim amicably, the disputing investor shall deliver to
the disputing Contracting Party written notice of its intention to submit a claim to
arbitration at least six months before the claim is submitted."15
This is evidence of the preference given to the amicable settlement of disputes by at-
tempting consultation and negotiation before referring disputes to arbitration. A last pos-
sible reason for the lack of Africa-China arbitrations in the Centre is that there are very
close ties between African governments and the Chinese government. This means that
disputes between a Chinese investor and an African government can often be resolved
through diplomatic processes without resort to arbitration under the convention.
One glaring trend that can be seen when studying cases involving African nations in the
Centre is that the tribunals that are selected by parties tend to be comprised of non-
African arbitrators." 6 They are usually presided over by a non-African national, and the
other two arbitrators are also non-African nationals. This is so in the majority of arbitra-
tions in the Centre. Some tribunals have been mixed, with African and non-African arbi-
112. Jie Wang, Investor-State Arbitration: Where Does China Stand?, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 493,
494 (2009).
113. Id. at 498.
114. NORAH GALLAGHER & WENHUA SHAN, CHINESE INVESTMENT TREAnES: POLICIES AND PRACTICE
382 n.3 (2009).
115. Id. at 401.
116. See, e.g., Ampal-American Isr. Corp. v. Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/ll (registered on
May 23, 2012) (arbitrators from Canada, Chile, and New Zealand) (pending); Int'l Quantum Res. Ltd. v.
Democratic Republic of Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/21 (discontinued on Apr. 12, 2012) (arbitrators
from Switzerland, Argentina, and France); Getma Int'l v. Republic of Guinea, ICSID Case No. ARB/I 1/29
(registered Nov. 3, 2011) (arbitrators from Belgium, Spain and Switzerland) (pending).
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trators.1 7 But where there is such a mixed tribunal, almost invariably the President of the
tribunal will be a non-African citizen. The only two exceptions are the cases of M. Meer-
apfel Sohne AG v. Central Afiican Republic,lS where the Tribunal was made up of arbitra-
tors from Morocco, Gabon, and Belgium, and the Moroccan national was President of the
Tribunal, and RSM Production Corp. v. Central Afican Republic,'19 where the tribunal was
composed of a Moroccan national who presided over the arbitration with two French
arbitrators. It is disappointing if cases involving African States are overwhelmingly pre-
sided over by non-African arbitrators. If we recall Article 13(1) of the convention, it pro-
vides that each contracting State may designate persons who may serve on panels of
arbitrators.120 The Centre then maintains a list of these potential arbitrators and parties
may select arbitrators from the list in the event of a dispute arising between them. Panel
members may serve for renewable periods of six years.121 Most developed countries have
designations that are up to date; for example, Australia (designations to expire in 2016),
Denmark (2018), France (2018), Japan (2014), and the United States (2015).122 There are
some developed countries that are not up-to-date with their designations, such as the
United Kingdom (whose panel designations expired in 2010), but by-and-large, the ma-
jority of developed countries are up-to-date with their designations of potential panel-
ists.123 But when we look at the designations of most African States, we find that they are
way behind in renewing their panel designations.124 Some illustrative examples are
Uganda (which has a designation that dates back to 1973), Central African Republic (des-
ignations expired in 1986), Madagascar (1987), Ghana (1990), and Liberia (1991).125 Yes,
there are some states that are up-to-date with their designations,126 but the majority are
not-and by a long stretch!' 27 African States should be looking for competent figures in
their respective societies who they can nominate to panels. If none exist, then they should
be nurturing and grooming potential panelists. It is important that Africans contribute to
the jurisprudence of the Centre if African States are to be meaningful members of the
Centre.
More discouraging still is that some African States, after selecting non-African arbitra-
tors, use non-African lawyers to represent them in the arbitrations. For example, in Grupo
117. See, e.g., AHS Niger v. Republic of Niger, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/1 1, Award (Jul. 15, 2013) (arbitra-
tors from Colombia (President), France, and Cameroon); Antoine Abou Lahoud v. Dem. Rep. Congo, ICSID
Case No. ARB/10/4 (registered on Mar. 4, 2010) (arbitrators from U.S. (President), France, and Egypt);
Compagnie d'Exploitation du Chemin de Fer Transgabonais v. Gabonese Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/
04/5, Award (Mar. 7, 2008), 26 (1) ICSID Rev. FILJ 153, 162 (2011) (arbitrators from Britain (President),
Germany, and Egypt).
118. M. Meerapfel Sdhne AG v. Central African Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/10, Award (May 12,
2011).
119. RSM Prod. Corp. v. Central African Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/2, Award (July 11, 2011).
120. Convention, supra note 7, art. 13(1).
121. Id. art. 15(1).





126. Id. Cameroon (2014), Mauritius (2015), Nigeria (2015), Morocco (2016), Somalia (2016), East Timor
(2017), DRC (their designation to the panel of arbitrators expires in 2018, but the one for the panel of
conciliators expired in 2012), Kenya (2018), and the Seychelles (2018).
127. Id.
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Francisco Hernando Contreras v. RepublicofEquatorial Guinea,128 the claimant selected Span-
ish legal representatives, and the respondent government was represented by lawyers from
the United States of America. In International Quantum Resources Ltd. v. Democratic Repub-
lic of Congo,129 the claimant was represented by Canadian lawyers, while the government's
lawyers were from France. Again in Meersk Olie, Algeriet A/S v. The Peoples' Democratic
Republic ofAlgeria,130 the claimant was represented by lawyers from the United States of
America, and Algeria chose legal representatives from the United States of America and
from France. In other tribunals, governments choose a team of lawyers made up of some
foreign lawyers and some lawyers from the host state. For example, in Standard Chartered
Bank (Hong Kong) Ltd. v. Tanzania Electric Supply Company Ltd.,31 the government was
represented by lawyers from the United Kingdom as well as Tanzania. Similarly, in Mil-
licom International Operations B. V. v. Republic ofSenegal,132 Senegal was represented by two
French lawyers and one Senegalese lawyer. The two states that have a good track record
of using local lawyers are Egypt (which uses the Egyptian State Lawsuits Authority) and
Zimbabwe (which uses the Zimbabwean Office of the Attorney General).133 There are yet
other states that do try to utilize indigenous lawyers, but more can and should be done. It
is important for African lawyers to be entrusted with international commercial arbitrations
by their own governments. Otherwise, it looks like the governments do not have confi-
dence in their own lawyers. What sometimes happens is that the claimant companies
choose non-African lawyers and then the African government feels that they also need to
select non-African lawyers who can "match" those of the claimants. Choosing non-Afri-
can lawyers in turn influences panel selection. Daele argues that it is these non-African
lawyers who influence states to select non-African arbitrators to the panels.134 The States
themselves also potentially lose out because they end up paying exorbitant legal fees for
these foreign lawyers whereas local representatives might charge much lower fees.
The seat of arbitrations tends to be in foreign nations, such as the United Kingdom
(London) or the Netherlands (The Hague). 3S Parties in arbitration want to settle their
disputes in neutral territory, but why is it that the perception seems to be that there is no
neutral territory on African soil? This view that Africa cannot host international commer-
cial arbitrations adds to the costs of governments who have to travel to Europe or the
Americas in order to resolve their disputes with foreign investors. African countries must
start with ensuring that they have adequate facilities for arbitrations, as well as competent
personnel to man them, and then they must push for arbitrations to be held on the African
continent.
128. Grupo Francisco Hernando Contreras v. Republic of Equatorial Guinea, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/
12/2 (registered on Mar. 23, 2012).
129. Int'l Quantum Res. Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/21.
130. Mxrsk Olie, Algeriet A/S v. People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/14
(registered July 20, 2009).
131. Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Ltd. v. Tanzania Elec. Supply Co. Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/
10/20 (registered on Oct. 1, 2010).
132. Millicom Int'l Operations B.V. v. Republic of Senegal, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/20, Award (Nov. 27,
2012).
133. See, e.g., Veolia Proprete v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/15 (registered June 25,
2012); Border Timbers Ltd. v. Republic of Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/25 (registered Dec. 20,
2010).
134. Daele & Reya, supra note 107.
135. Lucy REED, JAN PAULSSON & NIGEL BLACKABY, GUIDE TO ICSID ARBTRATION 48 (2011).
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The costs of arbitrations are also cause for concern, bearing in mind the fragile econo-
mies of most African countries. The Centre is financed out of charges that it metes out on
disputants for using their facilities. But Article 17 of the convention goes on to add that
where
the expenditure of the Centre cannot be met out of charges for the use of its facilities,
or out of other receipts, the excess shall be borne by Contracting States which are
members of the Bank in proportion to their respective subscriptions to the capital
stock of the Bank, and by Contracting States which are not members of the Bank in
accordance with rules adopted by the Administrative Council. 136
Chapter VI of the Convention covers the costs of proceedings. Article 60(1) provides that
it is up to each Tribunal to determine the fees and expenses of its members in consultation
with the Secretary General of the Centre.137 Article 61(2) provides that,
in the case of arbitration proceedings the Tribunal shall, except as the parties other-
wise agree, assess the expenses incurred by the parties in connection with the pro-
ceedings, and shall decide how and by whom those expenses, fees and expenses of the
members of the Tribunal and the charges for the use of the facilities of the Centre
shall be paid. Such decision shall form part of the award.' 38
This means that the African nations will have to pay to travel to the seat of the arbitra-
tion, they must contribute some money towards financing the Centre, they have to pay
the fees and expenses of the arbitrators, as well as representation fees for their legal coun-
sel, and then they might also have to pay the expenses of the other party should an award
of costs be made against them. Let's see how those costs can add up:'3 9
1. A party lodging an arbitration claim must pay a non-refundable lodging fee of
US$25,000.
2. If a supplementary decision is requested after the award has been rendered, then the
requesting party must pay US$10,000 for such a supplementary decision.
3. The same amount as above is payable for requests for the interpretation, revision, or
annulment, in whole or in part, of the award or the resubmission of the dispute to
another tribunal should the original award be annulled.
4. The arbitrators are entitled to a fee of US$3,000 for every day that they are engaged
in the arbitration, as well as travel and subsistence allowances.
5. Apart from the arbitrators, the Centre is itself entitled to levy administrative charges
following the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. This is to the tune of US$32,000
annually.
6. Parties must also pay for any additional services from the Centre, such as the provi-
sion of copies or translations.
136. Convention, supra note 7, art. 17.
137. Id. art. 60(1).
138. Id. art. 61(2).
139. Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, Schedule of Fees (2013), available at https://icsid.worldbank
.org/ICSID/FrontSenlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=scheduledFees&reqFrom=Main.
VOL. 47, NO. 2
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 265
In Malicorp v. the Arab Republic of Egypt, the claimant submitted that it had expended a
total of C239,734.14, and the respondent submitted that it had expended $489,773.60.140
This begs the question of whether arbitration in the Centre is really the cheaper alterna-
tive that African States were promised.
The argument that arbitrations are supposed to be a quicker alternative to litigation has
been discussed above. Yet, the Centre has been subject to much criticism for delays in
finalizing proceedings. On average, arbitrations under the convention take between three
to four years, which cannot be described as a speedy resolution.141 This can be attributa-
ble to many reasons such as delays in appointing arbitrators. Sometimes after the tribunal
has been constituted, one or more arbitrators may resign, thus necessitating the appoint-
ment of replacements. For example, in Sociiti Ouest Africaine des Bitons Industries v. Sene-
gal, the claim was registered in November of 1982, and the tribunal was constituted in
September of 1983 but had to be reconstituted in December of 1983 and again in May of
1985, after the resignations of two arbitrators.142 This delayed proceedings as parties had
to select new arbitrators. The dispute was finally concluded by an award rendered in May
of 1988-more than six years after its initial registration.143 In other cases, delays are
caused by the death of an arbitrator, such as in Patrick Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of
Congo, where the Secretary General registered the claim in October of 1999, and the
tribunal was constituted in November of the following year.144 But it had to be re-consti-
tuted following the death of one of the arbitrators in February of 2002, thus necessitating
the appointment of a replacement.145 The arbitral award was rendered in February of
2004.146
Delays are more marked where annulment proceedings are concerned. Annulments are
governed by Article 52 of the convention, which provides that either party to a dispute
may request the annulment of an award by written application to the Secretary General.147
The grounds upon which an award may be annulled are where
(a) The Tribunal was not properly constituted;
(b) The Tribunal manifestly exceeded its powers;
(c) There was corruption on the part of a member of the Tribunal;
(d) There was serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or
(e) The award failed to state the reasons on which it was based.148
140. Malicorp Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB1/08/18, Award (Feb. 07, 2011).
141. Anthony Sinclair, Louise Fisher & Sarah Macrory, ICSID Arbitration: How Long Does It Take?, 4
GLOBAL ARB. REv. (2009), available at http://www.goldreserveinc.com/documents/ICSID%20arbitration%
20%2OHow%20long%20does%20it%20take.pdf.
142. Soci6t6 Ouest Africaine des B6tons Industriels v. Senegal, ICSID Case No. ARB/82/1, Award (Feb. 25,
1988), 2 ICSID Rep. 164, 191-94, (1994).
143. Id. at 190.




147. Convention, supra note 7, art. 52.
148. Id.
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Applications for annulment must be made within 120 days after the date on which the
award was rendered.149 Article 52(3) provides that the Chairman of the Centre must ap-
point an ad hoc Committee of three persons from the Centre's Panel of Arbitrators to
consider the application for annulment.150 The criteria is that members of this committee
cannot have been on the original tribunal that rendered the award; neither can a member
be of the same nationality as any of the disputants. The award may be annulled in whole
or in part and if it is so annulled, parties are free to resubmit the dispute to a new tribunal.
Numerous criticisms have been leveled against the annulment procedure. It has been said
that "ICSID of course has lost much of its credibility as a consequence of the annulments
of arbitral awards which have added another negative feature to the massive complexity of
its constitution and rules"' 5 and also that,
the substantial effort made by the creators of the ICSID regime to insulate the pro-
cess from national review will be rendered almost meaningless if every award can be
challenged internally and subject to mere second guessing . .. if this unhappy trend
were to continue potential parties would be justified in avoiding the ICSID arbitral
process." 5 2
Annulments affect the final and binding nature of the arbitral award and can make the
dispute resolution process drag over a long period of time, which is against the desired aim
of choosing arbitration over litigation. Perhaps one of the most famous cases in this re-
gard is that of Klockner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH v. Cameroon.5 3 In that case, a conglomer-
ation of European countries was engaged in the construction and operation of a fertilizer
company in Cameroon. They had a falling out with the government over the non-repay-
ment of a loan. The companies registered their dispute with the Centre on April 14,
1981, and the arbitral tribunal (composed of a Uruguayan President and two other arbi-
trators, one from the United States and one from France) was constituted on October 26,
1981.154 The tribunal rendered an award on October 21, 1983, in favor of the govern-
ment on the grounds of bad faith on the part of the claimants in their dealings with the
government.155 The claimants submitted an application for annulment of the award, and
this application was registered on February 16, 1984.156 The Chairman of the Centre
constituted an ad hoc committee to determine the merits of the application on March 19,
1984, which committee, on the March 19, 1984, decided to annul the award. 57 The
dispute was then resubmitted to another arbitral tribunal in July of 1985, but with the
tribunal only being constituted in March of the following year. This tribunal took two
149. "Except that when annulment is requested on the ground of corruption such application shall be made
within 120 days after discovery of the corruption and in any event within three years after the date on which
the award was rendered." Id. art. 52(2).
150. Id. art. 52(3).
151. Stephen R. Bond, Dispute Resolution in the New Europe: 1992 and Arbitration, 5 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB.
REP. 15 (1990).
152. STEPHEN J. TooPE, MIXED INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 259 - 60 (1990).
153. Kl6ckner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH v. United Republic of Cameroon and Socit6 Camerounaise des
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years to dispose of the dispute and its award was rendered on January 26, 1988.158 This
second award also became subject to an annulment application, 59 and the decision of the
second ad hoc tribunal was that the award should stand. With this decision (rendered on
May 17, 1990), the dispute finally came to a conclusion, almost ten years after the dispute
had originally been registered with the Centre. This flies in the face of the goal of arbitra-
don being to give the parties speedy, final, and binding resolution to their disputes.
Another key feature of arbitrations involving African States before the Centre is that
about half of the claims against African States are dismissed, most at the jurisdictional
stage rather than on the merits. Banro American Resources, Inc. v. Democratic Republic of the
Congo160 was dismissed on the ground that the tribunal found that it did not have jurisdic-
tion. In Malicorp Ltd. v. the Arab Republic of Egypt,161 where the company alleged that the
government's actions of withdrawing its permits were illegal, the tribunal held that they
were justified on account of breach of contract by the investor, inter alia because the
investor was enjoined to incorporate a domestic company in Egypt for the running of the
project, yet it failed to do so. The tribunal held that each party must pay its own legal fees
and expenses of their representatives, as well as half the costs of the arbitration proceed-
ings, including the fees of the tribunal and the Centre. 162 Again in Gustav F. W. Hamester
GmbH & Co. KG v. the Republic of Gbana,63 the tribunal found in favor of the government
and dismissed the proceedings. The tribunal held that each party shall "bear the costs of
the arbitration in equal shares; [e]ach Party shall bear its own legal fees and expenses."'-
Thus, even where the government wins arbitrations, they still lose out because the tribu-
nals do not order the claimants to bear the costs of the arbitrations; thus, it becomes an
expensive victory for the government. If the tribunals were to award costs to governments
where claims are dismissed, then this might have the effect of chilling litigation and ensur-
ing that only watertight cases are brought for arbitration. This might be more favorable
to African State parties.
In ICSID Case Number ARB/05/22 (Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of
Tanzania),165 the claimants succeeded in proving a violation by the state of a BIT between
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United Republic of
Tanzania,166 but the tribunal held that, as the claimant had failed to sustain a claim for
damages, it was not entitled to compensation but merely to a declaratory order. It further
held that each party should pay its own costs.' 67 So again, even though the case was not
158. Id.
159. Kltcker Industrie-Anlagen GmbH v. United Republic of Cameroon, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/2,
Committee Decision on Annulment, 1 1 (May 3, 1985), 1 ICSID Rev.-FILJ 89 (1986).
160. Banro Am. Res., Inc. v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/7, Award (Sept.
1, 2000).
161. Malicorp Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/18.
162. Id. at 47.
163. Gustav F W Hamester GmbH & Co. KG v. Republic of Ghana, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/24, Award,
1 362 (June 18, 2010).
164. Id. at 102.
165. Biwater Gauff Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, 812 (uly
24, 2008).
166. Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania for the Promotion and Protection of Investments,
U.K-Tanz., Jan. 7,1994, U.K.T.S. 1996 No. 90.
167. Biwater GauffLtd., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, 813.
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dismissed per se, the claimant failed to get the relief it wanted, and although the govern-
ment did not have to compensate the claimant, it still lost money due to the costs of the
arbitration.
Many more cases never reach a final arbitral award because of discontinuance. Approxi-
mately sixteen arbitrations have been discontinued on different grounds. Some are dis-
continued on the basis of Arbitration Rule 44 (Discontinuance at Request of a Party).168
The rule provides that
[i]f a party requests the discontinuance of the proceeding, the Tribunal, or the Secre-
tary-General if the Tribunal has not yet been constituted, shall in an order fix a time
limit within which the other party may state whether it opposes the discontinuance.
If no objection is made in writing within the time limit, the other party shall be
deemed to have acquiesced in the discontinuance and the Tribunal, or if appropriate
the Secretary-General, shall in an order take note of the discontinuance of the pro-
ceeding. If objection is made, the proceeding shall continue.169
One illustrative example is the Piero Foresti v. the Republic of South Africa arbitration, which
was registered under the Additional Facility.170 The claim revolved around South Africa's
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, 2002,171 which enjoined mining
companies operating in South Africa to achieve 26 percent ownership rights of such com-
panies by historically disadvantaged persons (HDPs) by 2014,172 and 40 percent HDPs'
participation in management by 2009.173 The companies claimed that the Act effectively
extinguished mining rights held by the claimants and that it was expropriatory and, thus,
against Article 5 of the BIT between South Africa and Italy.174 But the claimants subse-
quently sought discontinuance of the proceedings under Article 50 of the Additional Fa-
cility Rules on the ground that they felt that they had "received partial relief" and that
"given the costs of the arbitration and current economic conditions, it was ... appropriate
to seek discontinuance.""75 The tribunal felt it warranted to order the claimants to pay
C400,000 in respect of the fees and costs borne by the respondent government in the
proceedings. The amount was decided taking into account "the Respondent's legal costs
and associated expenses as well as the fees and expenses of the Tribunal and the
Centre."'7 6
168. Arbitrations discontinued at the request of the claimant on the basis of Rule 44 are Tanzania Elec.
Supply Co. Ltd. v. Indep. Power Tanzania Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/98/8 (discontinued on Aug. 19, 2010);
Scancem Int'l ANS v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/12 (discontinued on July
10, 2008); Am. Mfg. and Trading, Inc. v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/l
(discontinued on July 26, 2000); Soci6t6 Kufpec (Congo) Ltd. v. Republic of Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/
97/2 (discontinued on Sept. 8, 1997); Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No.
ARB/89/1 (discontinued on June 24, 1993).
169. ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, supra note 51, at 121, Rule 44.
170. Piero Foresti v. Republic of South Africa, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/1, Award, (Aug. 4, 2010).
171. Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (S. Afr.).
172. DEPT. OF MINERAL RES., REPUBLIC OF S. AFR., BROAD-BASED Socio-EcoNomic EMPOWERMENT
CHARTER FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN MINING INDUSTRY, available at http://www.polity.org.za/polity/gov
docs/misc/mining-charter.htm.
173. Id.
174. Piero Foresti, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/1, Award, 1 54.
175. Id. at 21.
176. Id. at 31.
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Other claims have been discontinued where there has been settlement between the par-
ties and they mutually sought discontinuance of proceedings under Arbitration Rule
43(1),177 which stipulates that,
[iff, before the award is rendered, the parties agree on a settlement of the dispute or
otherwise to discontinue the proceeding, the Tribunal, or the Secretary-General if
the Tribunal has not yet been constituted, shall, at their written request, in an order
take note of the discontinuance of the proceeding.' 78
Sub-article 2 further expands that "[i]f the parties file with the Secretary-General the
full and signed text of their settlement and in writing request the Tribunal to embody such
settlement in an award, the Tribunal may record the settlement in the form of its
award."'79 Guadalupe Gas Products Corp. v. Nigeria,'80 Southern Pacific Properties (Middle
East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 81 and Miminco LLC v. Democratic Republic of the
Congo'82 are examples of arbitrations that were discontinued under Rule 43(2).183
The last category of discontinued cases is where the tribunal itself discontinues an arbi-
tration. This is usually on grounds of Regulation 14(3) of the Administrative and Financial
Regulations. The article reads thus:
"(a). . . the parties shall make advance payments to the Centre ...
(i) initially as soon as a Commission or Tribunal has been constituted, the Secretary-
General shall, after consultation with the President of the body in question and, as far
as possible, the parties, estimate the expenses that will be incurred by the Centre
during the next three to six months and request the parties to make an advance pay-
ment of this amount;
(ii) if at any time the Secretary-General determines, after consultation with the Pres-
ident of the body in question and as far as possible the parties, that the advances made
by the parties will not cover a revised estimate of expenses for the period or any
177. Arbitrations discontinued on the basis of Rule 43(1) include the following: Shell Nigeria Ultra Deep
Ltd. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/18 (discontinued on Aug. 1, 2011); Partici-
piones Inversiones Portuarias SARL v. Gabonese Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/17 (discontinued on
Jan. 10, 2011); Olyana Holdings L.L.C. v. Republic of Rwanda, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/10 (discontinued
on Jan. 7, 2011); Joy Mining Machinery Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11 (dis-
continued on Dec. 16, 2005); Soci6t6 d'Etudes de Travaux et de Gestion SETIMEG S.A. v. Republic of
Gabon, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/1 (discontinued on Jan. 21, 1993); Ghaith R. Pharaon v. Republic of Tuni-
sia, ICSID Case No. ARB/86/1 (discontinued on Nov. 21, 1988); Holiday Inns S.A. v. Morocco, ICSID Case
No. ARB/72/1 (discontinued on Oct. 17, 1978); Gabon, ICSID Case No. ARB/76/1. See List of Concuded
Cases, INT'L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INvESTMETrr DISPUTEES, (Sept. 17, 2013), https://icsid.world
bank.org/ICSID/FrontServletrequestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListConcluded.
178. ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, supra note 51, at 120, Rule 43(a).
179. Id.
180. Guadalupe Gas Prods. v. Nigeria, ICSID Case No. ARB/78/1 (award embodying settlement agreement
rendered on July 22, 1980).
181. S. Pac. Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3, Award
(May 20, 1992).
182. Miminco LLC v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/14 (award embodying
settlement rendered on Nov. 19, 2007).
183. See List of Concluded Cases, supra note 177.
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subsequent period, he shall request the parties to make supplementary advance
payments.
(b) the Centre shall not be required to provide any service in connection with a pro-
ceeding or to pay the fees, allowances or expenses of the members of any Commis-
sion, Tribunal or Committee, unless sufficient advance payments shall previously
have been made;
(d) .. . each party shall pay one half of each advance or supplemental charge, without
prejudice to the final decision on the payment of the cost of an arbitration proceeding
to be made by the Tribunal ...
If any proceeding is stayed for non-payment for a consecutive period in excess of six
months, the Secretary-General may, after notice to and as far as possible in consulta-
tion with the parties, move that the competent body discontinue the proceeding.184
Several tribunals have discontinued arbitrations involving African States as parties on
the grounds of lack of payment of advances pursuant to the above Articles 5 -for example,
in Ahmonseto, Inc. v. Arab Republic of Egypt 1s6 and in Russell Resources International Ltd. v.
Democratic Republic of the Congo.187 Discontinuance means wasted time and wasted re-
sources for the parties involved and it means that the disputes are not resolved with final-
ity by the rendering of a binding award.
VI. Conclusion
African States have been parties to the International Convention for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes for decades now and have been involved in many cases before its
arbitral tribunals. But African States themselves hardly ever bring cases against foreign
companies that have set up shop in their territories. This gives the impression that arbi-
trations are supposed to offer relief only for foreign corporations against African govern-
ments and not the other way around; yet arbitration is supposed to be a tool to be wielded
by either of the parties to a commercial transaction. Furthermore, African States have
failed to host any arbitrations on their territories; neither do their professionals (lawyers
or otherwise) get much exposure and practice in either representing states or sitting in
arbitral tribunals. But it is conceded that some African States lack lawyers with the skills
and practical experience required in this type of dispute resolution process. If local law-
yers simply do not have the necessary skills, then governments cannot entrust them with
such cases. More will have to be done to capacitate indigenous lawyers in order to reverse
the current position. The astronomical costs involved in arbitrations have also been
shown to make the proceedings of questionable value to African States. In addition to this
is the waste of time that results from numerous cases being dismissed or discontinued on
various grounds or awards being annulled on various grounds.
184. ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rues, supra note 51, at 61, Reg. 14(3).
185. See List of Conduded Cases, supra note 177.
186. Ahmonseto, Inc. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/15, Award (June 18, 2007).
187. Russell Res. Int'l Ltd. v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/11 (discontin-
ued on Feb. 10, 2009).
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African nations were enticed to ratify the convention because of promises that foreign
investors would find their economies more attractive to invest in. Yet, there has not been
a proven correlation between membership and investment flows into African countries.
Foreign investment gravitates towards countries with the highest financial returns and
greatest perceived safety. Where debt problems are severe, governments are unstable, and
economic reforms are only beginning, membership to the Centre will not be enough to
sway investors to invest in that State. One also wonders if Africa is a more dangerous
continent for foreign investment than others such that guarantees of access to arbitration
is imperative for these states to attract foreign investment. A cursory look at the case list
shows that many more cases are brought by investors against South American countries
than African ones.
The recommendations are therefore three-fold. First, to make the Centre more benefi-
cial to African Member States, these states must capacitate their people to take a more
active role in the arbitrations-as legal representatives and as tribunal members. African
States should also invest in the necessary infrastructure and human capital development
that would allow African countries to be used as the seat of arbitrations under the conven-
tion. Second, Roland Burrows opined that "arbitration can cost just as much or as little as
the parties wish it to cost." 88 It is imperative that states thoroughly assess what contrib-
utes to the accelerated costs of arbitration and try to minimize such costs, e.g. by hiring
local representatives. Third, as membership to the Centre merely gives investors added
confidence when they have already decided to invest in a country but does not, in and of
itself, make an investor choose a country as its investment destination, it is crucial that
African nations prioritize the improvement of their investment climates in order to attract
foreign direct investment and not believe that mere membership to the Centre will neces-
sarily lead to improved investment inflows.
188. CHARTERED INsr. OF ARBITRATORS, supra note 36, at 16.
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